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PER DIEM ARGUMENTS IN PERSONAL
INJURY CASES
I. INTRODUCTION

The basis for allowing monetary compensation for pain
and suffering is that the injured party should be compensated
to the extent that money operates to bring feelings of
satisfaction to offset physical suffering. 1 As the law stands
today it is agreed that something can be recovered for
pain and suffering but that there is yet no yardstick by
which this intangible can be converted into dollars and
cents. 2 If we are seeking some magic formula for the
computation of damages, valid in each and every case, we
are doomed to disappointment.
The courts are of the
opinion that such damages are incapable of any exact
mathematical computation, and that the amount awarded is
within sole discretion of the trier.3 About all the jury can
be told is to award plaintiff a sum that will reasonably
compensate him for his pain and suffering.
While in agreement that the question of compensation
for pain and suffering rests ultimately with the jury, the
courts are divided as to the right of counsel to comment
on the amount of these damages. The courts are also
divided on the issue whether or not the counsel should be
allowed to suggest to the jury various modes or formulae
which might aid in awarding plaintiff fair and reasonable compensation for his pain and suffering.
1.
McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 88 (1935).
2.
Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955); Aetma
Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944); Haycook v. Christie.
249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
3.
McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 88 (1935); see Gray v. Washington Water
Power Co., 30 Wash. 665, 71 Pac. 206, 209 (1903) in which the court said:
"It
is true that there is no gauge furnished by the law for measuring
such damages,_ and that it is, to a great extent, sentimental. But there is.
an element of sentiment in all damages,-even in the possession and use
of money itself,-for
a given amount of money may be of far more value
to one person than to another. While all those considerations tend to prevent the assessment of damages in any case from being absolutely adequate or measured with exactness and understanding, they will not prevent the approximate measurement, and must be submitted to the best
judgment of the jury."
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II.

PER DIEM ARGUMENTS

Per diem arguments constitute one technique of trial
court advocacy. It is a device whereby the counsel, in his
closing argument to the jury, suggests that the jurors apply
a fixed monetary figure per day, per month or per year
and multiply this figure by the number of days, months
4
or years plaintiff is expected to live.
The most common method applied by counsels in arguing per diem is well illustrated by the chart set fourth
below. This chart was introduced by plaintiff's attorney
in a personal injury case where the infant plaintiff sought
to recover damages for the loss of his leg.5
" 'Mike'
Age 9

Braddock
Expectancy 56 years

Pain and suffering to Date 395 Days
Experience of accident
Hospital 3-24-4-5-52
First 30 days at home
To date 353 days

$5,000
1,200
300
700

Inability to Lead Normal Life
3-24-5-31-52 crutches
6-1-10-31-52 pylon
11-1-52 to date articificial limb

340
459
348

Humiliation and Embarrassment

1,915
$10,262

20,440 days

Future 56 years

Medical
Checkup by doctor once a year
Artificial legs
Repairs and Maintenance
Stump Socks
Extra pants, shoes, socks
4.

$

440
3,600
2,640
985
4,400

See, e.g., Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961) ; Affett

. l'ilwaukee

&

Suburban Transp

Corp.,

11

Wris.

2d

604,

106

N.W.2d

274

(1960).
5.
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v.
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957).

Braddock, 96 So. 2d

127, 129

(Fla. 1957),
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Limb adjustment every 2 weeks

2,912
$14,977

Pain and suffering, 20,440 days

20,440

Humiliation and Embarrassment, 20,440 days 40,880
Inability to Lead Normal Life, 20,440 days
Loss of Earning Capacity, 5500 x 55 per
cent x 56
Total

40,880
121,000
$248,439

While a small minority of jurisdictions forbids counsel
the use of per diem arguments and even forbids him to
disclose the jury the amount sued for,6 a substantial number of courts have sanctioned the right of counsel to employ
such demonstrative means in order to gain a more adequate
award for the plaintiff.7 Although the Supreme Court of
Minnesota permitted counsel the application of per diem,
the court has limited the use of such method by saying
that it was to be used purely for "illustrative" purposes. 8
In its recent controversial decision of King v. Railway Express Agency, 9 the Supreme Court of North Dakota has
apparently sided with the minority rule in absolutely forbidding the counsel to argue per diem. A closer examination of the case seems to reveal, however, that this court
might allow such methods if they are used only as illustration. 0
Opponents of the method argue that to permit plaintiff's
6.
Cooley v. Crispino, 21 Conn. Supp. 150, 147 A.2d 497 (1958); Henne
v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958); Caley v. Manicke, 24 111. 2d 390.
182 N.E.2d 206 (1962); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958);
Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl. 191 (1896).
7.
Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Corkery v.
Greenberg, 114 N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1962); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.-W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109
N.W.2d 828 (1961); Johnson v. Brown, 345 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1959); J. D.
Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
8.
Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d
633 (1958).
9.
107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961).
10.
I.d. at 517. "Had counsel for the plaintiff merely suggested to the
jury
that a method by which they might determine damages for pain
and suffering was by first determining what such pain and suffering
was worth per day, per week, per month, or per year and then told the
jury to multiply such sums by the number of days, weeks, months, or
years that the jury found, from the evidence, that plaintiff would suffer
such pain and suffering, such argument would have been permissible."
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counsel to suggest and argue to the jury an amount to be
allowed for pain and suffering calculated on a fixed basis
allows him to get before the jurors what does not appear
in the evidence."
Verdicts should be based, they argue,
on deductions drawn by the jury from the evidence presented and not the mere adoption of calculations submitted by
counsel. The majority of the courts point out that even in
the absence of any evidence as to monetary amounts, if
the record shows that the plaintiff has suffered and will
continue to suffer pain and embarrassment, counsel has the
right to state to the jury what he thinks would constitute
proper damages.' 2 Because of the very absence of a yardstick to measure such damages, the counsel should be allowed full latitude in order to bring out all proper inferences
which are reasonable in view of the evidence regarding
plaintiff's past and probable future suffering. 3
A second argument against the use of the per diem
foi aula is that the estimates of the counsel may tend to
instill in the minds of the jurors impressions not founded
on the evidence. 14 Although this argument may be valid
in certain instances," the danger that the jury will obsequiously follow the suggestions of plaintiff's counsel may
substantially be diminished if proper instructions are given
by the trial judge."
Under our adversary system the defense attorney has wide latitude to counteract any overinfluence exercised by opposing counsel on the jury.
Courts rejecting the per diem argument often base their
prohibitory rule on the proposition that such technique
constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury who
are alone to determine what is to be a fair and reasonable
compensation. 7 It has been asserted that amounts cal11. King v. Railway Express Agency, 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961); Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 Atl. 111 (1936).
12.
Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957).
13.
Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1962).
14. Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
15.
See, e.g., Seaboard Air Lines R.R. v. Braddock, 96 So. 2d 127 (Fla.
1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 892 (1957) where the amount of the verdict
was exactly the same as what was asked by plaintiff's counsel in his per
diem argument.
16.
The court said in Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Iowa 1016, 1027, 7 N.W.2d
188, 194 (1942), "The trial court has a broad discretion in passing on the
propriety of argument to the jury, with which we will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse of that discretion."
17.
Affett v. Milwaukee
106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).

&

Suburban

Transp.

Corp.,

11

Wis.

2d

604.
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culated on a mathematical basis would displace the jury's
concept of what is a fair and reasonable amount to be
awarded for such damages in the light of the common
knowledge and experience possessed by the triers of the
facts.1 8 It is because the very nature of pain and suffering defies exact admeasurement in monetary terms, that
the majority of the courts allow the counsel to suggest a
practical method of reasoning which the jurors may employ
to aid them in making a reasonable and fair estimate."
As one court stated: "In determining the amount of an
award for pain and suffering a juror or judge should necessarily be guided by some reasonable and practical considerations. It should not be a blind guess or the pulling of
2'
a figure out of the air. 0
It has been argued that permitting the use of per diem
argument by the court puts the defendant in the position
of having to rebut an argument which has no basis in the
evidence.21 If defendant's counsel attempts to argue a lower
per diem figure, he has, in effect, admitted his client's
liability and renders the impression to the jury that his
only aim is to diminish the amount of the verdict against
his client. It must be noted that defendant's negligence
will be adjudged by the jury upon the evidence introduced
during the trial and such determination is unlikely to be
influenced by arguments for or against a monetary award.
In arguing a lower per diem basis, on the other hand,
counsel for the defendant could either cast doubt upon the
validity of such method by skillful illustration and criticism
or advance arguments to keep the evaluation of the damages reasonable and objective.22 He may also assert why
a lower per diem figure should be used, as well as point out
to the jury that the plaintiff's estimate may contain overlapping items such as pain and suffering, disability, inability
2
to lead a normal life, humiliation and embarrassment. 3
Finally, counsel for the defendant may introduce the use
18.
Certified T.V. and Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 109 S.E.2d 126 (Va.
1959).
19.
Yates v. WVenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961).
20.
Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4, 11 (6th Cir. 1956).
21.
Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
22.
See Note, 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 302 (1959).
23.
See Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Braddock, 96 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1957)
(dissent), cert denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957).
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of a sliding-scale per diem evaluation which would tend to
keep the figure in proportion to the possibly diminishing
24
suffering.
These arguments appear to be sufficiently convincing
for the majority of the jurisdictions to allow the use of per
diem arguments and entrust the trial court to curb its
abuses and to properly instruct the jury as to the illustra25
tive nature of such technique of advocacy.
A small minority, however, has steadfastly refused to
grant the right to the counsel to employ such demonstrative
means in his attempt to gain a more adequate award for
the plaintiff. In an apparent over-concern for the integrity
of the jury, some of these courts have gone so far as to
forbid counsel to divulge to the jury the amount contained
in the ad damnum clause. 26 The rationale of this doctrinarian attitude is somewhat elusive as the pleadings are
part of the public record and as such are open for inspection
27
by the jurors.
It has been mentioned before that the Minnesota courts
have restricted the application of blackboards, charts, placards and oral suggestions of a mathematicl formula for
purely "illustrative" purposes. 28 This vague term apparently refers to a restriction of per diem arguments whereby
the counsel may make a suggestion of a mathematical
formula to the jurors in order to aid them in reaching an
award, but he may not mention a fixed monetary amount
as basis for such calculations. Recognizing that per diem
arguments are never evidence but only illustration and
suggestion, such curtailment of counsel's right by the court
seems to be rather tenuous.
"To prohibit counsel from arguing money damages is to curtail his partisan function and to deny
the plaintiff the benefits of advocacy where persuasive techniques are of most crucial importance
24. For an illustration of a sliding-scale per diem evaluation, see
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956).
25. See note 7 supra.
26. See note 6 supra. See also Jimmy's Cab, Inc. v. Isennock, 225 Md.
1, 169 A.2d 425 (1961) where mentioning the amount contained in the ad
damnum clause did not constitute reversible error if jury were instructed
by the court not to consider it as evidence.
27. See Jimmy's Cab, Inc. v. Osennock, 225 Md. 1, 169 A.2d 425 (1961).
28. See note 8 supra.
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to him. . . .The plaintiff sues for money. The
defendant defends against an award of money.
The jury is limited to expressing its findings in terms
of money. . . . It must retire to the jury room
in vacuo on this essential of the case where the
unmentionable and magical conversion from'29broken
bones to hard cash may then take place.
III.

BOTTA V. BRUNNER:

AN ANALYSIS

There have been only a few courts dealing with the
problem of per diem arguments and mathematical formulae
in evaluating pain and suffering which have failed to cite
the famed Botta v. Brunner30 case since decided by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1958. The decision has
received a maze of criticism by legal writers 31 and from
the bench,32 and has aptly been referred to as a "blot on
the judicial concept of this country. 3 3 A somewhat extensive analysis of the case is believed to be merited not
only because it is still regarded as a landmark case in this
field of the law, but also to illustrate the unfortunate role
of judicial misinterpretation of pre-existing case law in
formulating a new doctrine.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The plaintiff
brought an action to recover for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. In his closing argument to the
jury, plaintiff's counsel suggested that in computing damages
for pain and suffering the number of hours that plaintiff
suffered might be multiplied by a dollar amount per hour.
The trial court, sustaining objection to the propriety of this
argument, was overruled by the Appellate Division. 34 This
court held that such argument was within the permitted
scope of counsel's persuasion and that the charge below,
warning of weight to be placed upon this type of argument,
was adequate to correct any potential prejudicing of the
jury. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the
decision on this issue; and held not only that a mathe29. Note, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522 (1958).
30. 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
31. See, e.g., Note, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 780 (1958): Note, 12 Rutgers L. Rev.
522 (1958); Note, 36 Dicta 373 (1959). But see 61 WV. Va. L. Rev. 302 (1959).
32. See, e.g., Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959): Johnson
v. Brown, 345 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1959).
33. TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS-BELLI SEMINAR, 195 (1961).
34. Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 126 A.2d 32 (1956).
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matical formula is an improper suggestion to the jury, but
that any statements by counsel demanding a specific award
or disclosing the amount sued for will constitute error.
In announcing its prohibitory doctrine the court cited
a number of cases from different jurisdictions to support
its stand.
However, none of the cases, excepting the
Pennsylvania decisions, 35 could be adjudged as proper
authority to substantiate the Botta rule.
Concededly,
Pennsylvania has followed a stern and unyielding course in
forbidding plaintiff's counsel to disclose the amount contained in the ad damnum clause to the jury, let alone to
use per diem arguments.3 6 It would appear that the remaining cases were either improperly cited, or had no
bearing upon the issue in question. A brief analysis of the
more relevant cases cited in the opinion of the court will
illustrate its judicial confusion.
The New York 37 and the Georgia decisions," cited by
the New Jersey court, had little to do with counsel's right
to argue a mathematical formula for pain and suffering,
but both cases dealt with instructions to the jury. The rule
of the Georgia case leaves little doubt to the validity of
this proposition:
"It was improper in this case for the court to
charge the jury the manner in which they should
reduce to its persent cash value the damages as
to any future pain and suffering and
the permanent
39
injuries sustained by the plaintiff.Other cases cited by the court dealt not with the right
itself but with the abuse of an implied right to argue
mathematical formulae before the jury. A Kentucky case,
cited in Botta v. Brunner, held:
"If it is proper for counsel who represents plaintiff to argue the amount of damages, likewise it is
proper for defense counsel to do so. Whatever may
35.
Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 At]. 111 (1936): Goodhart v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1. 35 At]. 191 (1896).
36.
Ibid.
37.
Wersebe v. Broadway & S.A.R.R., 1 Misc. 472. 21 N.Y.S. 637 (1893).
38.
Louisville and N.R.R. v. Bean, 174 S. E. 209 (Ga. 1934).
39. Id. at 211.
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be the rule in other jurisdictions, this court is
committed to one that counsel may within reasonable limits argue to the jury the amount of damages it should return when that argument is based
upon the extent of the injuries
the evidence shows
4
the plaintiff has suffered.'1 0
Clearly this court is not denying the right of counsel
to argue per diem damages for personal injuries, but quite
the opposite. By the very act of restricting the right, the
court implicitly endorsed it. The same logic was present
41
in two other cases cited from the jurisdictions of Texas
42
and Massachussets.
The three federal cases 43 cited by the court apparently
endorse the holding of Botta v. Brunner, but since these
cases were dealing with the turn of the century feud over
"subjective" versus "objective" damages, they should have
no application here.
As one examines subsequent decisions by this same
New Jersey court,4 4 one is inclined to suspect a note of
uncertainty, even perhaps remorse for the Botta decision.
It is only hoped that this court will reverse its relentless
stand in the near future whereby it would return the counsel
the right to advocate his client's cause through the most
appropriate means.
IV. CONCLUSION
The underlying fear that juries will be too liberal in
an area of compensation which has no definable limit will
not be dispelled by denying counsel the use of methods
which cause the jury to think in terms of true compensation rather than to guess at an arbitrary figure. Keeping
the award in proportion to the suffering should be, in part,
the function of the counsel for defense.
40.
Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706. 183 S.W.2d 637. 639 (1944).
41.
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Pyeatt, 275 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1955).
42.
Gardner v. State Taxi Inc., 336 Mass. 28. 142 N.E.2d 586 (1957).
43.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Field, 137 Fed. 14 (8th Cir. 1905): Alabama
G.S.R.R. v. Carroll, 84 Fed. 772 (5th Cir. 1898): St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v.
Parr, 56 Fed. 994 (8th Cir. 1893).
44.
See Carlucci v. Stickman, 50 N.J. Super. 96, 141 A.2d 68 (1958);
Paradossi v. Beinheur Bros. Oil Co., Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 41, 146 A.2d 515
(1958): Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 155 A.2d 111 (1959); Crosa
v. Lamb. 60 N.J. Super. 53, 158 A.2d 359 (1960).
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Finally, there is no basis in law or logic to ask the
jury to arrive at a verdict by a blind guess. The blindness
of justice is symbolic to her impartiality - not her judgment.
It is against common sense to ask a jury "to embark in
a rudderless vessel on an unchartered sea."
MIKLos L. LONKAY

